Research on the labor market impact of immigration typically relies on a single-good model of production with separable capital.
INTRODUCTION
Immigrants compose a substantial and rising fraction of many countries' populations (e.g., Hanson 2009 ) and often arrive in their new country with a different mix of skills than the existing workforce has. 1 As a result, immigration often has a substantial impact on skill ratios in the host country. For example, Table 1 shows the net change in immigrant stock in proportion to the existing workforce in the 1990s by broad education (college/noncollege) for several developed countries. The difference in this ratio, shown in column 3, approximates immigration's percentage impact on the college/noncollege ratio. [Letting I S and N S represent the quantity of immigrant and native-born skilled labor, and I U and N U unskilled labor, respectively, one can see that the impact of immigration on the log skill ratio is given by 
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There is quite a bit of variation across countries in this measure. The United States stands out among developed countries in the 1990s as having immigration reduce the skill content of the workforce, although more recently, even immigration to the United States has raised its college share. Not shown in the table is the extent of regional variation within countries: Immigrants, for example, tend to cluster into ethnic enclaves in the countries where they settle. In the United States, which is the focus of many of the studies discussed below, a similar measure ranges from −0.12 in Salinas and Anaheim, California, to 0.09 in State College, Pennsylvania (computed with 5% public use 2000 Census of Population and Housing using immigrants who arrived in the 1990s).
One standard way to assess the impact of these immigration-induced skill-mix changes on wages is to model the economy with a single aggregate production function with separable capital, often with a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) between skill types. Conveniently, the impact of immigration on skill ratios can then be mechanically translated into an impact on wages with just a few elasticities, for example, as is computed in Table 1 , column 4, assuming a typical estimate of the college/noncollege elasticity of substitution. Specifically, the percentage change in the college relative wage in column 4 is computed as   labor, which is roughly in line with estimates from (nonimmigration studies by) Katz & Murphy (1992) and Goldin & Katz (2008) , among others. The calculation requires only a single aggregate production function parameter both because a single production function describes the aggregate economy and because capital's response to skill-mix changes will have no impact on relative wages when capital is separable.
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There are at least two potential problems with this simple model. The issue that has received the most attention is that simulations of immigration's impact on the wage structure using the standard single good model (like those computed in column 4 of Table 1 ), tend to be much larger in magnitude than the reduced-form estimates from so-called area studies, which exploit variation in the extent of immigration across regions within a country.
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In particular, several literature reviews have found that reduced-form estimates of immigration's impact on wages tend to cluster around 0 (Borjas 1994 , Friedberg & Hunt 1995 , Longhi et al. 2005 . Some researchers have suggested that area studies are poorly identified both because immigrants may endogenously choose high-wage locations (e.g., Borjas 2003) and because natives may resist labor market competition by moving away (Borjas et al. 1997 , Borjas 2006 ). However, the latter claim is strongly disputed by other evidence (e.g., Card 2001) , and the former has been addressed using a variety of natural experiments and instruments. Nevertheless, some progress has recently been made on resolving these conflicting views. Card (2009) argues that aggregate and area studies do actually produce roughly consistent answers about the impact of immigration on the US wage structure when the aggregate production function is specified to include only two education groups, college and noncollege (consistent with the wage evidence).
As the first row of Table 1 shows, the predicted impact of 1990s immigration on the US wage structure using this approach is indeed small. This is because US immigrants are roughly balanced on the college/noncollege education margin. Indeed, the expectation that immigration should have a large impact on wages, at least in the United States, comes mostly from the view that immigration's much larger impact on the high school dropout/completion margin [0.1 in the 1990s, and over 0.3 in some areas (not shown in the table)] ought to severely depress the wages of high school dropouts. Card provides cross-city evidence that dropouts and graduates are perfect substitutes, which is also consistent with evidence from aggregate variation (Goldin & Katz 2008 , Ottaviano & Peri 2012 . 4 Still, it may be optimistic to say that Card has completely resolved the differences between aggregate and area findings because even his estimates of the inverse elasticity between college and noncollege workers are smaller than estimates from aggregate sources (e.g., Katz & Murphy 1992) , and some recent area estimates are even smaller (e.g., Dustmann & Glitz 2012) .
A second issue is that research outside of immigration tends to support richer models of aggregate production. The assumption that capital is separable from labor in production runs counter to a large number of studies that suggest capital is a relative complement of skilled labor, including papers on skill-biased technological change (SBTC) (e.g., Autor et al. 1998 , Krusell et al. 2000 .
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There are also models, which enjoy some support, in which the production technology endogenously responds to changes in skill ratios: endogenous growth models, models of directed technical change, and models of endogenous choice of technique. Models of endogenous choice of technique derive from the idea is that producers at a given time may have a variety of different technologies available for producing the same good, but these technologies will differ in their skill requirements, and thus adoption of a production technology will depend on the skill mix.
These models are supported by Beaudry & Green (2003 , 2005 , Caselli & Coleman (2006) , and Beaudry et al. (2010) , among others; this idea has an even longer tradition in historical research (e.g., Goldin & Sokoloff 1984) . These models are also similar to multisector open economy models, in which a market can adjust to an increase in the relative supply of some skill type in part by producing relatively more of the traded goods that employ it intensively. This is effectively another way in which immigration can shift the economy's production technique, which cannot be accounted for by a single-good model.
These richer models of production may help address the first issue: they can potentially help account for the smaller than expected estimates of immigration's impact on the wage structure. In essence, the impact of immigration on the wage structure may be mitigated, in the long run, by other ways in which the economy adjusts to skill-mix changes. Below I show, for example, that a level of capital-skill complementarity in line with estimates alone shrinks the predicted impact of immigration on relative wages by 40%. There is another way to look at this.
Although many of these richer models have compelling features, the empirical support for them is based largely on cross-country or other aggregate correlations, leaving the possibility that it is spurious. Researchers can apply well-developed strategies for identifying immigration's impact on wages to identify its impact on other outcomes predicted to be affected in these richer models of production (e.g., the capital output ratio) to help more credibly evaluate them.
Indeed, researchers have begun to do just that. This article reviews recent papers that evaluate alternative models of the labor market using the response to immigration. A key focus is on papers that evaluate capital-skill complementarity, endogenous choice of technique, and multiple sector models. But I also review research examining other ways in which immigration may affect the structure of production, including findings on how immigration affects growthrelated outcomes, such as productivity and patenting, entrepreneurship, and firm formation. I begin with a more detailed exposition of the different models, before turning to the empirical evaluations.
THEORIES The Standard Model
Consider first the single-good model of the economy that has become standard in studies of the labor market impact of immigration. For simplicity, consider two labor types, S and U for skilled and unskilled, respectively, and a single type of capital, K. A standard approach is to write down a single aggregate production function that is separable in capital and labor:
More generally, one might have several labor types in the function f. Immigration is modeled as affecting the relative quantities of the different labor types, in some cases with a very modest degree of imperfect substitutability with natives of the same type.
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This modeling approach is used by a large number of studies, including ones that disagree substantially about the impact of immigration on the labor market (e.g., Card 2001 , Borjas 2003 , Ottaviano & Peri 2012 ).
(Interestingly, earlier studies of the labor market impact of immigration had richer production structures, including Altonji & Card 1991 , Grossman 1982 , and Borjas 1987 For the purposes of this discussion, I simply assume that g is homogeneous of degree one; most recent studies specify g and f together as a nested CES production function, often with a Cobb-Douglass outer nest.
Specifying capital as separable in production essentially makes it ignorable in the estimation of wage impacts.
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In a perfectly competitive labor market, Equation 1 conveniently implies that relative wages are independent of capital:
For example, it has become common to define S as college-educated labor and U as noncollege labor, and with a nested CES structure, Equation 2 would reduce to 1 ln ln
, where  is the elasticity of substitution between college and noncollege labor [i.e.,
]. As described above, taking a consensus value for 1/  of twothirds for this skill pair [i.e., an  of 1.5, roughly consistent with Katz & Murphy's (1992) estimate of 1.41], one can translate the skill-mix changes in 
is only a function of r, the rental rate of capital [where
, not skill ratios.) However, increases in S/U do increase capitallabor ratios, a point I return to when distinguishing this model from one featuring capital-skill complementarity (see the next section). [Rewriting the first-order condition for capital as
ones finds that an immigration-induced increase in
S/U will raise   , / f S U L and must therefore also raise / K L .] It is convenient throughout the article to discuss the effect of increasing S/U, even though US immigration has typically reduced skill ratios in recent decades (unlike immigration in most other countries) which has the opposite signed effect.
One potential problem with the standard model is that it is at odds with substantial evidence, going back at least to Griliches (1969) , that capital and skill are relative complements.
Moreover, a large literature argues that computing technologies, in particular, are complementary with skilled labor. This has been supported by evidence that the rapid decline in their prices in recent decades has pushed up relative demand for skilled labor (e.g., Katz & Murphy 1992; Krueger 1993; Autor et al. 1998 Autor et al. , 2003 Autor et al. , 2006 Autor et al. , 2008 , so-called SBTC. So I now turn to models that include capital-skill complementarity.
Capital-Skill Complementarity
Any production structure in which ln / ln 0 
Under Equation 3, short-run relative wages can be expressed as
Equation 4 shows that capital complements skill, ln / ln 0 Again, this is a general result.
In the case of Equation 3, one can approximate the long-run elasticity of relative wages to changes in the skill mix by substituting the first-order condition for K into Equation 4 (both log linearized), which produces 
-and raises skilled relative wages, mitigating the short-term impact. This is driven by the fact that unskilled labor is substitutable for a factor whose long-run price is fixed.
In contrast, when capital is separable and therefore skill neutral, the short-and long-run impacts of skill-mix changes on relative wages are the same (see the previous section). Stokey (1996) , Lewis (2011b) , and Autor et al. (2003) . Start with the parameter values assumed in Stokey (1996) capital is skill-neutral (row 7), again 40% smaller using Lewis's estimates. In summary, Table 2 shows that relative wage impacts simulated using a production function with skill-neutral capital may substantially overstate the long-run relative wage impact of immigration.
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Importantly, for most purposes, the long run may be the most relevant for the study of immigration's impact on the labor market. Immigration is typically an ongoing flow, not a onetime spike, and capital stocks appear to adjust rather quickly, as evidenced by their reversal in trend within a few years of shocks in US data (see, e.g., Ottaviano & Peri 2006) . Indeed, direct evidence on the speed of wage adjustments to immigration shocks suggests that full adjustment occurs within a few years (e.g., Card 1990 , Cohen-Goldner & Paserman 2011 In particular, in assessing the impact of immigration with decadal frequency, for example, as is frequently done in US data, treating capital stocks as flexible seems most appropriate. Henceforth, I therefore consider mainly long-run equilibria. In contrast, the consensus value for the elasticity of substitution between college and noncollege labor used above (and also used in simulation studies such as Borjas et al. 1997 ) is estimated using annual variation and so may capture only short-run relative wage responses (before capital can adjust). Recall from Equation 4 that in the short run, relative wages respond essentially in the same way as if capital were skill neutral. I revisit this point in the empirical section below.
Choice of Technique Models
Some models allow producers to choose among several production functions. For example, in Beaudry & Green (2003 , 2005 , the arrival of computers represents a "technological revolution" (Caselli 1999 ) essentially modeled as the arrival of a more skill-intensive technology. In this and similar models, the skill mix affects producers' optimal choice of technology, so the response of technology to immigration may mediate immigration's ultimate labor market impact.
To see this, consider a simplified version of Beaudry & Green's model depicted in 
where
is a share parameter which producers choose, and A is a total factor productivity (TFP) parameter, whose value is for now exogenous. Relative wages satisfy
Beaudry et al. (2010) and Beaudry & Green (2003 , 2005 A related set of models suggests that the skill mix affects the nature of innovations in production technology, models of so-called directed technical change (Acemoglu 1998 (Acemoglu , 2002 . If immigration increases the size of the skilled workforce, it also increases inventors' potential monopoly profits from inventions that raise skilled productivity, thus giving an incentive to direct innovation toward skilled workers. Similar to models of endogenous technical choice, the relative demand curve in these models is less downward sloping in the long run than in the short run. Unique to models of directed technical change, however, is the possibility that long-run relative demand curves slope upward. Acemoglu (1998 Acemoglu ( , 2002 proposes this as an explanation for why relative skill demand has outpaced supply over the past few decades, leading to increased wage inequality.
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Multisector Models
The standard approach of representing the economy as a single-good aggregate production function may also be inadequate. More generally, it is well known that as long as there are more industries (which are really products of differing factor intensities) than factors of production, this result of factor price insensitivity will hold.
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Similar to the two-by-two case in Figure 1 , instead of affecting relative wages, a relatively skilled immigrant influx is absorbed by so-called Rybczynski effects, shifting the output mix toward skill-intensive products. This is possible because there is infinitely elastic world demand for the different products, or more simply, the shifts in the output mix in this small economy have no effect on product prices. 
where /
is the share of i-type workers in j. Equation 7 decomposes growth in type i labor demand into changes in the product mix (the first term) and changes in factor intensities within a product (second term). In an extreme case, if factor price equalization fully holds, the second term is 0, and all changes in the skill mix are entirely absorbed by changes in the product mix, ln ln
price equalization). In another extreme example, immigration-induced skill-mix changes are absorbed by changes in production technique, and the second term is large (despite there being little response of wages). Papers evaluating this model create empirical versions of Equation 7 and ask how much skill-mix changes are absorbed between rather than within industries (potentially imperfect proxies for products; see below).
Models with Human Capital Externalities
Recently, studies of immigration have allowed for Marshallian human capital externalities.
Adopting the framework from Moretti (2004a,b) , Peri (2011), and Docquier et al. (2010) , relax the assumption that A in Equation 5 is exogenous and instead model it as
If 0   , there are human capital spillovers. Adding this feature to production changes the impact on wage levels but not on relative wages. As Moretti describes it, an increase in the skill share has a smaller negative impact on skilled wage levels than is implied by the elasticity of substitution (between S and U). This is because the supply effect is partially offset by the human capital spillover. Note that this equivalently implies that a less-skilled immigration inflow would reduce the wages of less-skilled workers by more than is implied by the elasticity of substitution.
EVIDENCE
With the exception of the model of human capital spillovers, all the alternatives to the standard model have a prediction in common: The long-run impact of immigration on the wage structure may be less than that implied by a comparable single-good production function with separable
capital. So what is the evidence?
Until recently, there was a strong prima facie case that at least one of the nonstandard (including open economy) models applied: Area studies, which estimate immigration's impact on labor by correlating the two across regions (e.g., metropolitan areas or states), consistently find very little impact of immigration on wages or employment outcomes (Longhi et al. 2005 (Longhi et al. , 2008 ; see also earlier reviews in Borjas 1994 and Friedberg & Hunt 1995) . Borjas et al. (1997) argue that such estimates were, in particular, smaller than what would be predicted by applying to an aggregate production function estimates of the elasticity of substitution between workers of different skill levels derived from aggregate US variation, such as Katz & Murphy (1992) .
Conversely, Card (2009) prominently argues that area estimates are consistent with aggregate estimates of the elasticity of substitution when the skill groups are properly specified in the aggregate production function. In particular, he provides cross-city wage evidence that college graduates and nongraduates are imperfectly substitutable, but high school dropouts and graduates are perfect substitutes and should be lumped together (with an adjustment for unit efficiency differences), leaving a production function with just two skill groups: college and noncollege. Responding to criticism that the area approach is also biased toward 0 by differences in relative demand correlated with immigrant inflows (e.g., Borjas 1994) or that natives offset the impact of immigration on the skill mix through intercity migration (e.g., Borjas 2006), Card also argues that the area approach requires a valid instrumental variable.
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He uses what has become a standard ethnic enclave instrument, which is the change in the skill mix that would occur if aggregate immigrant arrivals, by country of origin, were apportioned to destination regions based on the lagged proportions of immigrants from that country in that region (the enclave). The instrument thus exploits the persistent regional patterns of immigrant flows by origin (e.g., the tendency of Middle Eastern immigrants to settle in Detroit), which are argued to be driven by family reunification or a preference for a culturally familiar environment rather than labor demand conditions. Table 2 , respectively, which can be interpreted as the short-and long-run relative wage impacts of skill-mix changes under capital-skill complementarity, respectively (when the short run elasticity of substitution between skill types is 1.5).
Capital-skill complementarity is not the only explanation for the difference between
Card's (2009) and Goldin & Katz's (2008) estimates; the other alternative models described above also involve long-run adjustments, which might help account for it. Moreover, even if it is an improvement over ordinary least squares, the enclave instrument may still have some correlation with relative demand conditions, biasing Card's estimates downward. Finally, their estimates may also differ just by chance. But even if reduced-form estimates of immigration's impact on relative wages do match aggregate parameter estimates, it does not necessarily imply that the standard way of parameterizing aggregate production is correct, as different models can predict roughly the same reduced-form impact of skill-mix changes on relative wages (as, e.g., Table 2 shows). Therefore, a more useful approach is to more directly evaluate these alternative models, as some recent immigration studies have attempted to do. I consider each model in turn below.
Capital-Skill Complementarity
Evidence for capital-skill complementarity goes back to at least Griliches (1969) , and more recently it has been evaluated in papers on SBTC (see also Hamermesh 1993) . Recent studies have also looked for evidence of it using immigration-induced variation in the skill mix. As described in the theory section above, these studies take advantage of capital-skill complementarity being present if and only if capital output ratios respond positively to exogenous increases in skill ratios. The advantage of this approach, relative to the typical SBTC approach of studying how capital adoption affects measures of relative skill demand, is the potential for finding valid exogenous variation (e.g., using the ethnic enclave-style instrument described above). Finding credible exogenous variation is much more challenging when the independent variable is some type of capital adoption variable.
One example of this new approach is Lewis (2011b) . This study merges data on equipment capital and output from Censuses of Manufactures, data on automation equipment from the 1988 and 1993 Surveys of Manufacturing Technology, and data on the skill mix from US censuses and Current Population Surveys, all aggregated to the metropolitan-area level.
Consistent with capital-skill complementarity, Lewis finds that immigration-induced increases in high school dropouts per high school graduate in a metropolitan area are associated with significantly decreased use of automation equipment and with decreased equipment-output ratios more generally, even within four-digit manufacturing sectors. Lewis's estimates are applied in rows 3 and 8 of Table 2 . One shortcoming of Lewis (2011b) is that it did not assess complementarity between capital and college-level workers, the complementarity emphasized by research on SBTC.
Peri (2012) provides some initial evidence on this front. He takes a reduced-form approach, examining the relationship between immigration and the growth in the components of a log-linearized version of Equation 5 using cross-US state variation over time (decennial census data). This analysis includes an examination of the relationship between capital-output ratios and immigration. He finds that immigration is associated with a significant decline in the share of a state's workers who are college educated, but not with a significant decline in capital-output ratios, even when using an IV approach similar to Card (2009) . Thus, he finds no evidence of capital-college complementarity. However, Peri did not have data on capital stocks by US state but instead imputed state-level capital stocks using industry-level data crossed with measures of state-level industry mix. Peri thus estimates only immigration's impact on changes in the capital output ratio that occur through its impact on the industry mix, which has generally been found to be small (see below). In Lewis (2011b) , the response of capital stocks is within industry. paper that does not distinguish between the response of capital-output ratios (which helps identify capital-skill complementarity) and that of capital-labor ratios (which does not necessarily).
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It seems appropriate for future studies of the labor market impact of immigration to allow for an impact on capital stocks, as there is some empirical support for capital-skill complementarity, immigration variation has been underexploited in its study, and reasonable values of complementarity imply that the wage impacts of immigration are perhaps 40% smaller than predicted by elasticities of substitution between skill types ( Table 2) . Although this is easier said than done (detailed data on capital stocks at the regional level tend not to be publicly available), feasible approaches could include examining data from different countries, where capital stock data may be easier to obtain, or using tabulations of US agriculture, manufacturing, and construction surveys. These tabulations (especially historic ones) do contain some information on capital or investment. Below I review some of the historical US evidence that uses these data.
Longer term it would be nice to develop more detailed regional measures of capital stock, using confidential microdata such as the Annual Surveys of Manufactures.
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In the near term, however, the lack of easily accessible data on capital stocks will mean that the standard model, in which capital is ignorable, will continue to have much practical appeal. Therefore, another approach would be to use simulation-based approaches, such as Table 2 , to determine how sensitive assessments of the labor market impact of immigration are to complementarity or to help more accurately interpret reduced-form estimates.
Choice of Technique and Open Economy Models
Peri (2012) examines directly whether immigration has affected the skill share parameter,  , in Equation 5 using US census-derived data on wages for college (S) and noncollege (U) workers.
As Equation 6 makes clear, the impact of immigration on  cannot be separately identified from the direct effect of immigration-induced changes in the skill mix on wages. To get around this, Peri imposes an elasticity between skill types, which he sets at 1.75. 
As was noted above, choice of technique models and open economy models can both
imply that the response of wages to skill-mix changes can be small. What distinguishes the two is that, in the latter, the economy responds to skill-mix changes with shifts in the product mix, whereas in the former, it responds with shifts in the production technique for a given product. On this front, studies including Lewis (2003) , Card & Lewis (2007) , and Gonzales & Ortega (2011) use employment data by industry to proxy for the product mix, the first term in Equation 7, and skill ratios within industries to proxy for the production technique, the second term. They then regress each component on skill-mix changes, instrumented with immigration instruments. These studies find that very little immigration-induced shifts in the skill mix, typically less than 10%, are accounted for by shifts in the industry mix, with most resulting from within-industry changes in skill intensity.
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Although this appears to be strong evidence against the importance of open economy adjustments, trade economists often argue that industry-level analyses suffer from aggregation bias, obscuring shifts in the product mix that occur at the subindustry level (e.g., Schott 2004).
To address this, Dustmann & Glitz (2012) use German data in which it is possible to measure skill intensity at the firm level. Comparing across German regions between 1985 and 1995, they generalize from Equation 7 and decompose immigration-induced changes in the education mix into within-and between-firm (rather than industry) and net entry components (similar to the other studies, they use employment as a proxy for output). They find that within-(permanent) firm changes in skill intensity account for 71% of immigration-induced skill-mix changes.
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The remainder is split evenly between shifts in employment across permanent firms, what they call "scale effects," and net entry. They then further split the net entry effect into changes in factor intensity and scale and show that much also results from changes in factor intensity. They separately demonstrate that an industry-level analysis would attribute less to scale effects than would a firm-level analysis, supporting the aggregation bias view, although the difference is not very large.
Although firms are not the same thing as products-some shifts in employment across firms might result from shifts in production methods rather than in the product mix (which the authors acknowledge)-it seems plausible that they are closer to products than industries are. In light of this, it is stunning just how responsive skill intensity within firms is to aggregate skillmix changes when relative factor prices are hardly changing in response to the same immigration shocks. [Dustmann & Glitz (2012) short-run elasticities of substitution between labor types. Second, it is important to establish the existence of a small wage impact before turning to direct evidence on choice of technique, however. In short, wage evidence is necessary but not sufficient. Third, apparent shifts in production technique in principle may be confounded by shifts in the product mix, which should be accounted for with care; at the very least, one needs to look within detailed industries. To date, however, the evidence appears to demonstrate that the product mix is very unresponsive to shifts in the skill mix, supporting the single-good modeling simplification.
As a final point, based on the evidence produced to date, choice of technique models are not necessarily empirically distinguished from models of directed technical change, in which skill-mix changes would also lead to attenuated wage responses and to shifts in production technique. On the one hand, one expects that the set of available production technologies might be similar across the regions where these models have been tested, which tends to support the choice of technique interpretation. On the other hand, there is some evidence that production innovations do not flow much beyond their region of origin, at least as measured by patent citations (e.g., Jaffe et al. 1993) . This is further discussed below.
Historical Studies
Choice of technique models have much greater and longer acceptance in economic history research. A prominent example is by Goldin & Sokoloff (1984) , whose model is similar to Beaudry & Green's (2003 , 2005 but predates it by two decades.
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Although Goldin & Sokoloff do not study the impact of foreign immigration, they tell a similar story: Industrialization occurred disproportionately in the northern United States, the authors argue, because unskilled labor, in the form of female and child labor, was relatively cheaply available compared with the south, where it was demanded in agriculture.
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Another advantage of economic history is that publicly accessible historical data on production in the United States are sometimes, perhaps surprisingly, richer than are equivalent modern public data. how inflows of immigrants affected agriculture crop mix and production methods. They find some evidence of Rybczynski effects, namely that an immigration-induced increase in farmers per acre of land was associated with a relative decline in wheat production, which they note historians consider a less labor-intensive crop than others. (Immigration-induced variation here refers to their IV estimates, which uses the kind of ethnic enclave instrument described above.) However, they also find an association with decreased cotton production, which is considered labor intensive. They also find that this increase was associated with a greater use of mules relative to tractors, and lower capital-labor and capital-land ratios, although the latter is not statistically significant.
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This is consistent with land and capital being q complements and capital and labor being q substitutes or neutral. The authors, however, do not find any evidence that capital complements labor relative to land (capital output ratios are not significantly associated with increases in farmers per acre).
The historical data seem to be largely untapped resources for immigration studies.
Although there are limitations, including a lack of individual-level wage data, such research could give new insight into how US labor markets adjusted to the large waves of immigrants of the past two centuries.
HUMAN CAPITAL SPILLOVERS, INNOVATION, AND PRODUCTIVITY
Moretti (2004a) finds that average wages among observably similar workers [and Moretti (2004b) that average productivity at observably similar plants] were higher in the 1980s in US metropolitan areas with a greater share of workers who were college educated than in other areas, which he interprets as evidence of Marshallian human capital spillovers. In contrast, Sand (2007) demonstrates that this positive association is not replicated in more recent data. Although, to my knowledge, it has not been considered in any immigration paper, a related idea is that the skill content of the workforce affects growth rates (e.g., Lucas 1988; Romer 1986 Romer , 1990 . [Bodvarsson & Van den Berg (2009, chapter 9) provide an extended discussion of the role immigration might play in various theories of economic growth.] This has been largely supported by cross-country correlations (e.g., Barro 1991) , which have been challenged as potentially entirely reverse causal (Bils & Klenow 2000) , among other problems.
Immigration may provide a way to break this endogeneity problem. For example, one could examine whether the spike in FSU immigration to Israel resulted in a divergence of Israel's growth rate from an appropriately chosen comparison region.
Although demonstrating human capital spillovers is interesting, it may be more fruitful for future research to evaluate mechanisms that might generate such wage spillovers, such as Peri's task specialization idea (or see Sand 2007) . On this front, new research has examined how immigration affects activities such as patenting and entrepreneurship, which provide potential channels through which immigration might affect productivity or growth. Below I review some recent findings. Lincoln's data. Some of the ethnic Indian and especially ethnic Chinese could be native born. In addition, Hunt & Gauthier-Loiselle examine long-run differences (10 and 50 year), which will capture spillovers that do not occur immediately; they generally find bigger effects in longer differences.
To return to the motivation of this section, the question is, does the regional association of high-skill immigration with increased patenting matter for the productivity or growth of that region? Other research suggests that it might. First, patent citations seem to fall off quickly in distance, indirectly suggesting that new ideas may have a larger impact on the region of origin than they do further away (e.g., Jaffe et al. 1993 , Maurseth & Verspagen 2002 , Peri 2005 ). In addition, there is at least a positive association between patenting rates and productivity and growth (Eaton & Kortum 1996 , Furman et al. 2002 . Indeed, Hunt & Gauthier-Loiselle (2010) use the latter of these two papers to project that the rise in college-educated immigration in the 1990s may have increased US GDP per capita by two percentage points. Nevertheless, they are careful to point out that other high-skill workers may contribute more to GDP than do scientists and engineers. In addition, studies that link patents to productivity are purely correlational.
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A potentially valuable avenue for future research would be to explore more of the content of innovations instead of just the count of innovations. For example, if a metric of the skill content of innovations could be developed, it might be used to help distinguish models of directed technical change from choice of technique models. Such metrics may not be simple to develop, however, which may be why we have not seen such research to date.
Immigrant Entrepreneurship
Immigrant entrepreneurship may also affect the structure of production. In the United States, immigrants are 30% more likely than natives to start businesses that have at least 10 employees within five years (Hunt 2011) , and they also make up a disproportionate share of business employers (Hellerstein & Neumark 2003 , Andersson et al. 2010 . Other research suggests that language skills may also be a key reason for the modest degree of imperfect substitutability between observably similar immigrants and natives (Lewis 2011a) . That low-English immigrants are concentrated at immigrant employers is consistent with this finding, suggesting that these immigrants operate in a somewhat distinct labor market.
High rates of immigrant entrepreneurship may also matter for productivity growth.
Descriptively, firm net entry accounts for a large share of productivity growth, so more attempts at starting businesses may lead to higher productivity. [For example, net entry accounts for 30%
and 100% of productivity growth in manufacturing and retail over a 10-year period, respectively (Haltiwanger 2009 
Because
is positive by capital-skill complementarity, capital's share is rising in S/U.
Equation 11 also implies that if capital's share is rising in S/U, capital and skill are complements.
Using similar substitutions of homogeneity-derived identities, one can show that the long-run response of relative wages satisfies
where SU c is the short-run elasticity of complementarity and 0 Column 4 = −2/3 × column 3 (i.e., the estimated impact of immigration on college/noncollege log wage gap, assuming an elasticity of substitution between college and noncollege of 1.5). 
KS
, where Lewis (2011b) estimates lns K /(U/S) = −0.56 (with U and S representing high school dropouts and completers, respectively), which evaluated at the mean U/S of 0.3 converts to an elasticity of 0.168. This is converted to an estimate of  (for the given value of s S and s K ) using the fact that
In that study, capital represents equipment only, which is why s K is smaller and s S is larger than in other rows.
Lewis also adds another CES nest to Equation 3, with another type of labor.
ENDNOTES
1
In this article, I largely assume away any impact of a skill-balanced inflow of immigrants and focus on the impact of inflows that affect skill ratios. As shown below, capital-labor ratios appear to quickly revert to their previous levels in response to shocks. I also assume that production is homogeneous and so ignore the role of agglomeration economies. As immigrants disproportionately settle in large metropolitan areas, returns to scale associated with immigration may be small. Another scale effect I ignore is the effect of immigration on the size of the consumer base (see Borjas 2009 ).
2 Ottaviano & Peri (2012) , and before them Borjas (2003) , generalize this to allow for a richer set of skill groups, but the approach is basically the same. In the long run, capital adjusts so that immigration has no impact on average wages, making the relative wage impact a sufficient description of the impact on the wage structure (for more details, see below).
3
It should be noted that this does not result from a difference in models: The same types of simple models used to simulate immigration's impact on wages such as in In such models, the elasticity parameter used to estimate column 4 in Table 1 is not necessarily wrong. Instead, this parameter applies only to a more limited context in which such other adjustments do not occur (the short run). The response of capital is relevant for the short-run impact of immigration on absolute wages.
As discussed below, however, the short run may have little empirical relevance to the impact of immigration.
9
It is also equivalent to state that capital has a greater elasticity of complementarity (Hamermesh 1993 ) with skilled than with unskilled labor (see the Appendix).
10
In contrast to the results in Table 2 , I find that simulations using Krusell et al.'s (2000) production function estimates (of Equation 3, but with S and U switched) imply very little sensitivity of relative wages to the adjustment of capital. However, their estimates also imply very little response of capital-output ratios to changes in skill mix (they estimate with aggregate data, in which capital-output ratios are stable), showing again that the two responses go hand in hand. In other words, their production function exhibits very little of what I define as capital-skill complementarity.
11
The short-run effects may have some relevance to the immediate aftermath of an event such as the Mariel boatlift or the refugee flows after Hurricane Mitch (Kugler & Yuksel 2008) . Card (1990) finds no evidence of impacts, even in the immediate aftermath of the boatlift. Other recent examples of studies of short-run immigration dynamics include Barcellos (2010) and Wozniak & Murray (2012) .
12
In the open economy interpretation of Figure 1 , wages are insensitive to skill-mix changes because the local economy is a price taker on the large world market (so shifts in the product mix can occur without affecting prices). In the Beaudry-Green interpretation of the model, it is because the output of the two techniques is assumed to be perfectly substitutable.
13 Beaudry & Green (2005) , trying to explain the same facts, obtain short-run upward-sloping relative demand from the assumptions that the modern technique is more skill intensive and less capital intensive than is the traditional one but that it has higher capital-labor ratios.
14 Card (2009) cites Fisher (1969) for the result that there is little theoretical reason to expect different industries to aggregate to a single production function and Fisher et al. (1977) for the result that in practice, simulated aggregations of CES industries with different elasticities of substitution appear to behave as a single aggregate CES production function.
15
This can hold even if not all industries are traded, as long as there are more traded industries than factors of production, and the ratio of marginal to average propensity to consume for the nontraded good does not exceed the inverse of capital's share of income (Ethier 1972) .
Homothetic preferences are sufficient for the latter.
16
More recent trade models feature potentially imperfectly substitutable local varieties of different goods. Ciccone & Peri (2011) review how shifts in the skill mix are absorbed in this more general framework.
17
In both Moretti (2004a,b) and Peri (2011) , this specification is for S for college and U for noncollege workers. Iranzo & Peri (2009) generalize this to allow for different spillovers from average education among college and noncollege workers.
18
In contrast with Borjas (2006) , most studies find little evidence that native outmigration undoes the local impact of immigration on the skill mix (e.g., Card 2001). Peri & Sparber (2011) argue that Borjas's (2006) specification is biased toward finding a migratory response.
19
The use of immigrants following other immigrants to similar locations as the basis of an IV strategy originates with Altonji & Card (1991) .
20
Both aggregate and cross-city data support the view that dropouts and graduates are roughly perfect substitutes. Using a similar approach, Card (2009) estimates an inverse elasticity between dropouts and graduates of 0.01 across cities. Using annual aggregate data, Ottaviano & Peri's (2012) estimates range from 0.029 to 0.039. Goldin & Katz (2008) also estimate a near-zero relationship in recent data.
21
A common approach in SBTC papers is to regress, using variation across industries, measures of the skill intensity of the labor mix on measures of computer-or capital-labor ratios and interpret positive coefficients as support for complementarity. Interestingly, some earlier SBTC studies are much more careful to examine capital-output ratios (e.g., Autor et al. 1998) . 
24
Neither study actually shows reduced-form estimates of the response of relative wages, which would have been a more transparent approach.
25
One exception is Lewis (2004) , who finds some initial support for the idea that the Mariel boatlift led Miami's output mix to shift away from skill-intensive manufacturing industries relative to comparison cities. However, the results are not robust to the choice of comparison region.
26
I refer to their IV estimates, which employ an instrument similar to Card (2001 Before them, Habakkuk (1962) argued that American manufacturing was more standardized because of the high cost of labor in the United States. Habakkuk's description has also been interpreted as a model of directed technical change.
28
Relatedly, using a sample from the original firm-level data from the 1850-1880 manufacturing censuses [see Atack and Bateman (1999) for a description], Kim (2007) shows that counties with high densities of immigrants were more likely to have had large factories, a proxy for industrial production. His evidence is, however, largely cross sectional, and although it does use instruments, many of the instruments seem likely to have some direct impact on the viability of large-scale manufacturing (e.g., distance to New York, access to waterways).
29
Similarly, Lew & Cater (2010) find faster adoption of (labor-saving) tractors in the US Northern Great Plains relative to a bordering area of Canada following the imposition of drastic US immigration quotas in the mid-1920s. this approach is at best suggestive.
